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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4369
This paper proposes a sovereign asset and liability 
management framework for analyzing the inter-
relationships between debt management, fiscal and 
monetary policies.  It illustrates the consequences 
of uncoordinated policy mix and extends Sargent 
and Wallace (1981 and 1993) by including debt 
This paper—a product of the Banking and Debt Management Department—is part of a larger effort in the Department 
to investigate and disseminate sound practices in public debt management. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted 
on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at etogo@worldbank.org. 
management. Examples of policy games played by fiscal, 
monetary, and debt management authorities reinforce 
the importance of policy separation and coordination to 
prevent domination by one authority over another which 
could lead to inconsistent policy mix.  
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There is growing consensus that public debt management should be integrated into a 
broader macroeconomic framework of analysis, but to date, there is little literature that 
places it into a coherent analytical framework.  Following Anderson (1999), Wheeler 
(2004) and Jensen (mimeo) this paper proposes a sovereign asset and liability 
management (ALM) framework for integrating debt management to the overall 
macroeconomic framework of analysis. 
 
Existing literature on optimal fiscal and monetary policies is well established. However, 
they have largely been developed in isolation (see for example, Chari and Kehoe, 1999, 
Blanchard and Fisher 1989) or where their interactions are examined, such as Sargent and 
Wallace (1981, 1993) the focus has been on the consequences of uncoordinated policies.  
The literature on debt management, on the other hand, has mostly developed in support of 
fiscal or monetary policies:
2 for example, Barro (1995) identified the role of debt 
management in tax smoothing, and Calvo and Guidotti (1990) identified the role of debt 
management as a commitment device in ensuring a time consistent monetary policy.   
 
The objective of this paper is to fill the gap in the literature and to establish public debt 
management as a separate policy with a different objective from those of fiscal and 
monetary policies, and to integrate public debt management into a broader 
macroeconomic framework of analysis.  The approach taken is not one of developing a 
joint optimization problem, but rather one of illustrating the importance of policy 
separation and coordination that ensures a consistent policy mix. It also illustrates the 
consequences of uncoordinated policies by extending the model developed by Sargent 
and Wallace (1981, 1993).  
                                                 
2 Useful literature reviews covering these are Missale: 1997, Leong: 1999, Chrystal: 1999.   4
 
The paper is structured as follows.  Following this introduction, section 2 establishes the 
case to separate debt management from fiscal and monetary policies.  However, 
separation does not preclude the need for policy coordination.  This is because in the real 
world, there are policy interactions, and therefore the importance of a coordinated 
approach to determining a consistent policy mix is discussed.  Section 3 then asks: Is 
there a way to analyze the policy coordination in a coherent manner?  It is argued that the 
ALM framework offers a useful conceptual framework for analyzing the coordination 
between debt management, fiscal and monetary policies and the foundation for the 
analysis is laid out.  Section 4 discusses the consequences of uncoordinated policies 
based on Sargent-Wallace (1993), extending it by including an additional policy player: 
the debt manager.  Section 5 concludes the paper. 
   
2. Separating Debt Management Policy from Fiscal and Monetary Policies and the 
Importance of Policy Coordination 
 
Traditionally, debt management policy was not considered a separate macroeconomic 
policy, but was subordinated to fiscal and monetary policies.
3  This is with good reasons: 
managing the volatility of debt servicing cost through sound debt management has clear 
implications for securing short-term fiscal space as well as the management of long-term 
fiscal risks.  Debt management is also a concern for the conduct of monetary policy when 
viewed as the management of the composition of assets available to the public between 
money and government paper.
4  The literature on debt management has followed this 
pattern: for example, the tax smoothing literature assigned the role of debt management 
in support of fiscal policy, and the time consistency literature assigned its role in support 
of monetary policy. 
 
                                                 
3  Policy separation should be accompanied by clear accountability framework and institutional 
arrangements in order to enhance credibility.  See for example, Currie, Dethier and Togo (2003) for a 
description of the evolution of debt management in OECD countries and for a discussion on the 
institutional arrangements for debt management. 
4  Through open market operations.   5
However, there is growing consensus among practitioners that debt management should 
be treated as a separate macroeconomic policy with its own policy objectives and the 
assignment of a separate policy instrument.  The trend was started by the New Zealand 
government in the 1980s, when the then incoming government recognized that without 
proper policy assignment and accountability framework for debt management, the risk 
remained that the fiscal targets set in the newly adopted Fiscal Responsibility Act would 
not be met.  In Europe, several countries that were heavily indebted in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s such as Belgium, France, Ireland, and Portugal took the decision to 
decentralize debt management to varying extent, in order to reduce the variability of debt 
service cost that could jeopardize the targets set by the Growth and Stabilization Pact.  In 
the U.K., debt management responsibilities were taken out of the Bank of England in 
order to eliminate even the perception of conflict of interest in conducting debt 
management and monetary operations. 
 
One of the main reasons for decentralizing debt management was that at least in the short 
run, the pursuit of the three policy objectives involved trade-offs, and the assignment of 
separate policy objectives would enhance the credibility and effectiveness of policy 
implementation.  For example, where the fiscal authorities are responsible for managing 
both fiscal policy and debt management policy, the fiscal authority may wish to keep the 
cost of debt servicing low in order to create fiscal space in the short run.  However, this 
may increase the volatility of future debt servicing and may force subsequent 
governments to cut expenditures or raise taxes.  While the fiscal authorities should be 
concerned with the long-term consequences, the reality is that they are often subjected to 
political pressures arising from election cycles that lead them to take myopic policy 
choices.   
 
Similarly, the core objective of the monetary authority is to control inflation, but if it was 
also responsible for debt management, it may be tempted to hold interest rates low.  This 
will help to keep debt servicing costs low, but risks the possibility of higher inflation in 
the future. Alternatively, the monetary authority may be tempted to issue inflation 
indexed debt to enhance their policy credibility, but raises the risk of increasing debt   6
service volatility.  Separating the management of debt from the management of fiscal and 
monetary policies can help avoid such conflicts, real or perceived, and can improve 
policy credibility.   
 
Credible policies are known to produce superior overall outcomes compared to less-
credible policies.  For example, a credible monetary policy will be successful in taming 
inflationary expectations and reduce future uncertainty, which will in turn reduce the risk 
premium on longer dated domestic currency debt.  Lower long-term interest rates are also 
likely to stimulate economic growth and improve the fiscal position, and help to reduce 
the fiscal deficit and debt burden.
5  This will further reinforce the credibility of monetary 
policy.  The experiences of New Zealand, Sweden, Denmark, and Ireland since the 1990s 
show that the implementation of a credible, coherent macroeconomic policy mix has 
helped generate such virtuous cycle, improving welfare of the society as a whole. 
 
What then are the separate policy objectives and the instruments used in the conduct of 
debt management, fiscal policy and monetary policy?  For debt management, the 
objective is to ensure that the government’s financing needs and its payment obligations 
are met at the lowest possible cost over the medium to long run, consistent with a prudent 
degree of risk.
6  This may be expressed as a numerical target for the stock composition of 
the debt, referred to as the strategic benchmark or the strategic target.  The policy 
instrument is medium to long-term debt, and the composition is managed through new 
debt issuance, as well as changing the composition of existing debt through interest rate 
and exchange rate swaps, debt buybacks and exchange offers.  The objective of fiscal 
policy is to achieve the least distorting budgetary policy that would stabilize output, 
improve the resource allocation and to manage the distributive effects.
7  Overall target for 
fiscal policy is typically set for the primary balance.  Managing the composition and level 
of spending and taxes are instruments used to achieve these policy objectives.  Finally, 
                                                 
5  Provided primary expenditures levels are controlled. 
6  World Bank and IMF (2001). 
7  For example, the stated fiscal policy objective in the UK is, over the medium-term, to ensure sound 
public finances and that spending and taxation impact fairly both within and across generations. The long-
term fiscal objective for New Zealand is to operate surplus on average over the economic cycle sufficient to 
meet the requirements for contributions to the NZ Superannuation Fund and ensure consistency with the 
debt objective (http://www.treasury.govt.nz/budget2006/fiscalstrategy/04.asp).   7
the objective for monetary policy is to achieve price stability, while maintaining output 
stabilization. Targets for inflation, interest rates, monetary aggregates, or the exchange 
rate are managed through open market operations or through non-market controls such as 
setting reserve requirements. 
 
However, the effectiveness of policy decentralization and its credibility depend on two 
further conditions.  The first is that complete policy decentralization is only possible 
under very restrictive assumptions, such as the availability of n policy instruments when 
there are n policy objectives (Tinbergen 1952) and these instruments need to be 
independent of one another, in the sense that the effects of any one instrument on the 
objectives are not proportional to those of another, or of any combination of others 
(Tobin 1993).  Lump sum taxation would be one such example of an orthogonal 
instrument, as is state contingent debt. 
 
While such strict instrument orthogonality is in practice rarely observed and unnecessary, 
the shortage of policy instruments tends to be more marked in less developed economies.  
For example, it is common to see both the monetary authority and the debt manager 
operating in the primary market to pursue their respective policy objectives.
8  Where the 
monetary authority issues its own debt and incurs direct interest cost, the public will 
perceive that it would have less incentive to raise interest rates to curb inflation, as it may 
wish to keep rates low in order to contain the cost of borrowing.
9  In essence, the shortage 
of instruments may force the authorities into potential conflict and weakens the 
credibility of their ability to achieve their main policy goal.
10 
                                                 
8  See for example, World Bank (2007). In Costa Rica, Indonesia, Lebanon, and Nicaragua, both the central 
bank and the ministry of finance issue short-term debt in the primary market.  
9  It has been observed in some countries that even if the central bank issues government debt on behalf of 
the ministry of finance through an agency agreement, the central bank feels compelled to keep the rates low 
to lower the costs of the debt.   
10  One of the reasons governments encounter less instruments than the number of objectives is due to 
incomplete markets, either due to the underdevelopment of the domestic government debt markets or 
simply because it is too expensive to have complete markets.  For example, if the government lacks the 
credibility that it is willing or able to honor the debt, then the market may demand prohibitively high risk 
premia to issue long-term fixed rate debt in domestic currency.  Or it may simply lack a policy to 
developing the domestic market, resulting in no or little incentives for the private sector to transact in the 
secondary market. The discussion on instrument independence helps highlight the importance of 
developing the domestic debt market from the perspective of macroeconomic stabilization policy.   8
 
The effectiveness of policy decentralization and the credibility of the respective 
authorities also hinges on the coherence of the overall policy mix.  A policy mix that is 
inconsistent, such as a pro-cyclical fiscal policy under a fixed exchange rate regime, can 
strain the credibility of the monetary authority’s commitment to defend the currency.  If 
the market observes that the policies cannot be sustained, then the pressure will build to 
change the policy mix.   
 
Here, we define policy coordination to mean some form of decision-making process that 
determines a consistent policy mix that would result in the type of society that citizens 
want their elected government to implement.  Governments would therefore need to 
figure out the desired economic outcome, and determine the policy mix through policy 
coordination that most effectively achieves this outcome.  In order to determine the 
desired economic outcome, ranking of preferences must be made.   
 
Ranking of preferences invariably involves trade-offs: this is simply because with limited 
resources, society cannot have all its wants and needs satisfied.  The relevant trade-off in 
our context is the trade-off between fiscal, monetary, and debt management policies 
given the government’s inter-temporal consolidated budget constraint.
11  For example, 
greater current period primary deficit can be supported with a low financing cost/high 
risk strategy. Alternatively, it can be financed through easy monetary policy which 
increases seigniorage income in the current period.
12  However, this choice of policy mix 
may mean that fiscal space may be reduced in the future if debt servicing costs increase 
                                                 
11  The government will also have to face policy trade-offs within fiscal, monetary and debt management 
policies through the choice of different policy instruments available to each of them, as well as between the 
policies.  Trade-offs within fiscal policy includes the trade-off between efficiency versus equity as well as 
intertemporal allocation of the tax burden.  Similarly, the debt manager faces the decision whether to take 
on additional risk to lower the debt servicing cost.  If citizens are poor and are unable to assume the 
additional risk that the government takes, then the government may want to act conservatively and 
minimize risk such as that coming from foreign currency exposure.  Finally, the trade-off that the monetary 
authority faces may be between inflation and unemployment or whether to rein on inflation today or in the 
future. 
12 Although the assumption that seigniorage provides net income to government may be strong for two 
reasons: first, empirical evidence suggests that seigniorage is not a significant source of government 
revenue, and second, seigniorage income may not necessarily translate into higher net profit transfers to the 
government.  Nevertheless, looking at seignorage is useful in the context of consolidated government and 
central bank balance sheet management.   9
due to the realization of risky events, or monetary policy needs to be tightened to reign in 
high inflation caused by lax monetary policy in earlier periods.
13  Policy interdependence 
and trade-offs between debt management, fiscal policy, and monetary policy are depicted 
in graph 1 and described in box 1. 
 
Graph 1. Interdependencies and policy trade-offs between debt management, fiscal policy and 
monetary policy 
Debt Management
Fiscal Policy Monetary Policy
•Exchange rate and interest 
rate policies constrain the 
amount of foreign currency 
debt and floating rate debt 
that can be issued. Nature of 
inter-relations differ 
depending on FX regime.
•Poor debt structures can 
jeopardize the CB’s ability 
to tighten interest rate or to 
depreciate / devalue.
•Debt structure affects the 
fiscal costs of debt servicing 
and can jeopardize fiscal 
sustainability.
•Tax and expenditure levels 
determine the levels of debt 
that needs to be issued.
•High and volatile inflation and interest rate may reduce government revenue by 
slowing down economic activity of the private sector. Sterilization and quasi-fiscal 
deficit can directly increase the level of debt. 
•Poor fiscal management and high levels of debt can increase inflationary 
expectations and cause interest rates to rise, and/or the currency to depreciate.
Interdependencies and policy trade-offs
 
                                                 
13  The other important consideration is whether current fiscal expenditures are wisely invested so as to 
generate future economic growth, which will in turn increase tax revenues and keep the debt to GDP ratio 
low.   10
 
Box 1. Policy interdependencies and policy trade-offs 
Poor debt management may force the fiscal authority to change its current course of policy as poor debt 
structures can suddenly increase the costs of debt servicing and force the government to cut planned 
expenditures in order to meet its debt obligations.  Conversely, poor fiscal policy can impact the 
effectiveness of debt management as tax and expenditure policies determine the levels of primary 
surplus/deficit and the amount of debt that needs to be issued.  When this level is excessive, investors will 
demand higher risk premium and may constrain debt managers from issuing the desired debt instrument at 
reasonable costs and achieve the targeted debt composition.   
 
Monetary policy can also constrain the debt manager’s actions, as exchange rate and interest rate policies 
can limit the amount of foreign currency debt and floating rate debt that can be issued. For example, debt 
managers may feel constrained issuing long-term, fixed rate, domestic currency debt or be forced to issue 
such debt at very high cost because, for example, investors expect higher inflation or devaluation in the 
future due to loose monetary policy stance.  Under such circumstances, investors may prefer debt indexed 
to inflation rates or short-term interest rates, short maturity debt or foreign currency indexed debt.  In turn, 
poor debt structures with large shares in short-term debt, floating rate debt or foreign currency debt can 
constrain the central bank’s willingness to increase interest rate or to depreciate / devalue domestic 
currency, as this can precipitate a debt crisis.   
Finally, monetary policy and fiscal policy are interdependent as high and volatile inflation and real interest 
rates may reduce government revenue by slowing down economic activity of the private sector, and central 
bank sterilization and quasi-fiscal deficits can directly increase the level of debt.  Poor fiscal management 
and high levels of debt can jeopardize monetary policy objectives as it can increase inflationary 
expectations and cause real interest rates to rise, and/or the currency to depreciate. 
 
The existence of policy trade-offs may explain why tax smoothing is rarely a stated 
objective for fiscal policy.  Complete tax smoothing is in effect a policy of zero 
(budgetary) risk regardless of cost (Missale: 1997).  The high costs associated with 
eliminating risk suggest that a zero risk policy is generally not a good idea.  This in turn, 
implies that a reasonable objective for debt management is not minimizing risk at any 
cost, but would be expressed in terms of cost and risk trade-off.  Similarly, most central 
bankers do not pursue a zero inflation policy because of the destabilizing effect on 
economic output if such a rigid monetary policy is pursued, and therefore are willing to 
accept non-zero inflation levels and variability.
14 
 
In the presence of policy trade-offs, how can a desired policy mix be determined?  One 
way to achieve the desired policy mix is to have a benign social dictator assign a policy 
mix, and then each policy maker can pursue its assigned goal though decentralized 
decision making.  A more realistic and democratic decision-making process is for the 
                                                 
14  Other reasons for not pursuing a zero inflation target are the presence of sticky prices which makes it 
difficult to make adjustments to relative prices, and the difficulty of how changes in the quality of goods in 
the CPI basket should be treated.    11
policy makers to agree to a coordinate policy based on a common vision of society and 
then to pursue the individual policies in a decentralized way.  Coordination should not be 
difficult if all policy makers embraced the common goal.  In practice, coordination 
involves haggling and negotiating, and/or take the form of some policy rules, but 
nevertheless these may be arrived at within the parameter of a common goal.
15  
 
Coordination mechanisms to achieve the ‘desired’ policy mix vary.  For example, in the 
EU context, the Stability and Growth Pact is an agreement between the European central 
bank and the ministry of finance of member governments to set a ceiling on the annual 
fiscal deficit and the overall debt level in order to facilitate the implementation of the 
desired monetary policy under a monetary union.  Implicit in the pact is that each 
government will also implement prudent debt management to reduce variability in the 
fiscal outcomes.  The rationale for the Pact is also about establishing policy credibility of 
the European common currency.  Fiscal Responsibility Laws that include target deficit 
and debt levels play a similar role.  Independent institutional arrangement can help to 
overcome central bank credibility issue, but this is not sufficient unless there is a 
coordinated and consistent policy mix. 
 
3. Analyzing Policy Consistency in an Asset and Liability Management Framework  
 
Having discussed the importance of policy separation and coordination between debt 
management, fiscal and monetary policies, is there a way to analyze whether a particular 
policy mix is consistent?  Anderson (1999) Jensen (mimeo) and Wheeler (2004) suggest 
that the asset and liability management (ALM) framework offers a coherent framework 
for managing the risks of the public debt portfolio and provides useful insights to 
understanding the coordination issues between fiscal, monetary, and debt management 
policies.  Such a risk management framework is consistent with the fiscal sustainability 
analysis, where fiscal, monetary, and debt management policies are subsets of public 
finance, both on a period by period basis, as well as on an inter-temporal basis.   
                                                 
15 Research in game theoretic approach of coordinating fiscal and monetary policies have also shown that 
non-cooperative behavior leads to sub-optimal outcomes and increase variability of prices and output levels 
(see for example Frankel: 1998).    12
 
3.1. Debt Management in an Asset and Liability Management Framework 
 
The ALM framework is useful in identifying and managing risks of the government debt 
portfolio.  The framework suggests that balance sheet risk exists when there is a 
mismatch between the financial characteristics of the assets and liabilities. Risk therefore 
is minimized when the financial characteristics of the assets match that of the liabilities.  
The largest asset of the government is the present value of future flows of the primary 
surplus, and the financial characteristics of these future flows depend on the fiscal 
objectives for managing this asset. 
 
The objective for managing the future flows of primary surpluses may be framed in terms 
of the objective for smoothing taxes.
16  Tax smoothing is preferable if taxes are 
distortionary (such as income taxes) resulting in economic inefficiency (see Box 2). 
                                                 
16 Tax smoothing implies that tax revenue increases when there is GDP growth, and tax revenue declines 
when there is negative GDP growth.  Tax smoothing may be more strictly referred to as tax rate smoothing, 





Box 2. Tax Smoothing (Barro: 1979, 1995) 
A good starting point is the Ricardian proposition, whereby if taxes are lump sum, and there exist 
certainty in economic activities and other conditions, then a tax cut today financed by bond issuance 
does not lead to increased consumption and thereby output.  This is because households foresee that 
government dis-savings today will be matched by a rise in taxes in the future, so households save for 
the anticipated rise in taxes by investing in the bonds, keeping the level of national savings unchanged.  
Households are indifferent with respect to the timing of the tax cut and tax increases as only their 
present values matter: this makes the timing and composition of public debt irrelevant.  Seigniorage is 
also irrelevant because there is perfect foresight about future prices so the change in money supply over 
time would be zero.  Thus the only binding constraint is that debt equals the present value of future 
primary surpluses.  Because citizens will be indifferent whether the government financed current 
deficits with taxes or bonds, the policy mix is irrelevant. 
 
If taxes are distortionary, such as taxation on labor income, then the problem of optimal fiscal policy is 
to minimize distortions created by revenue collection subject to inter-temporal budget constraint.1/  
Raising revenue creates distortions and the distortions rise more than proportionately to the rise in 
revenue.  This characterization gives rise to the result that distortions are minimized when tax rates are 
smoothed over time.  For example, during a recession, the level of tax revenue will fall with the decline 
in economic activity.  Rather than raising taxes to finance current expenditure, the government should 
run a primary deficit financed by debt issuance.  In boom time, debt should be paid down through the 
primary surplus resulting from increased revenues accompanying economic growth.  Thus, tax rates are 
smoothed over recession and boom periods through the management of the timing of the debt.2/  
However, with the assumption of perfect foresight in place, the composition of debt is irrelevant.  “This 
is because perfect certainty for interest rates, price levels, exchange rates, etc, the rational pricing of 
each instrument on financial markets ensures that each option entails the same time path of real interest 
payments on the public debt” (Barro: 1999).  Again, because taxes will be raised for sure to pay down 
the debt, and because the time path of real interest payments on the debt is also known for sure, this 
policy mix is sustainable.  
 
In turn, if there exist uncertainties in the government’s budgetary outlays which affect the tax base or 
borrowing conditions, then the management of budgetary risk becomes important and the composition 
of debt becomes relevant.  This is because it would be optimal for the government to issue debt whose 
payoffs are contingent on the relevant risks.  The relevant risks are those that impinge on the 
government’s budget – e.g., uncertainty in government expenditure, the revenue and rates of return 
payable on government debt (Barro: 1999).  For example, to hedge against an unexpected negative 
shock to GDP, the government can issue debt whose (debt servicing) payout is positively correlated to 
GDP.  With uncertainty, issuing explicit state contingent debt whose debt payout is contingent on the 
outcome of the primary balance will ensure tax smoothing.  In other words, minimizing budgetary risk 
from the perspective of tax smoothing implies that the composition and timing of debt matters.  
 
1/  Taxes are distortionary if they affect the decision of the taxpayer on how much and when to work.  In 
particular, the anticipated variation in tax rates over time can induce changes in the timing of 
consumption.  The government’s objective then is to minimize this distortion.  The determination of the 
tax rate that minimizes the effects of distortions on the tax payers’ behavior in turn, determines the 
timing and level of the debt. 
2/  As Barro (1999) noted, if the increase in expenditure is permanent, then the appropriate policy 
response would be to raise taxes.   14
While tax smoothing may not be a commonly stated objective for fiscal policy, such a tax 
policy constitutes a class of counter-cyclical fiscal policy characterized by automatic 
stabilizers which helps to stabilize the economy through the business cycles.  
Governments may structure fiscal policy in such a way that the primary surplus is 
generated when the economy is growing and the primary deficit increase when the 
economy is in recession.  Such a counter-cyclical fiscal policy which stabilizes the 
economy is a more commonly stated objective for fiscal policy.
17  
 
Given the counter-cyclical objective for managing fiscal policy, the ALM framework 
suggests that debt structured in such a way that debt servicing (out)flows diminishes 
when there is  primary deficit (and increases when there is primary surplus), would help 
minimize the risk that taxes must be raised, expenditures reduced, or debt defaulted 
during a recession or an financial crisis.  This is because when the characteristics of 
government debt matches with the characteristics of the fiscal assets, debt management 
acts to minimize the variance in the overall budget, while fiscal policy in turn acts as an 
automatic stabilizer for the economy.  A stylized depiction of the matching of debt 
servicing flows and the primary surplus which reduces the variance of the overall budget 
is show in graph 2. 











                                                 
17  For example, the Golden Rule in the United Kingdom. A counter cyclical fiscal policy may comprise a 
combination of tax smoothing policy and a primary expenditure policy which increases during recessions 
with the increase in welfare payout such as unemployment insurance and reduces during good times as 
such payout decreases.  
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What are the debt instruments that have the desired characteristics?  A state contingent 
debt whose payout is conditional on the realization of the primary surplus would clearly 
hedge the government from negative shocks to the fiscal assets.  For example, a GDP 
indexed debt, with GDP acting as proxy for tax revenue, could ensure that debt service 
payments co-move with government revenues.  However, because of market 
imperfections, it is not possible to have a debt that is contingent on all states of nature, 
while it is certainly possible to issue debt instruments that are contingent on certain states 
of nature, including conventional debt instruments.   
 
Conventional debt such as nominal fixed rate debt or inflation indexed debt has state 
contingent characteristics depending on the nature of the economic shock.
18  A negative 
demand shock causes price levels to fall with the contraction of the economy.  With 
falling prices, a debt whose debt servicing is indexed to the price level would hedge the 
fiscal position when revenues fall and demands on expenditures rise as a result of 
increases in items such as unemployment claims.  
 
A hedge on the fiscal position would also be obtained with nominal, fixed rate debt where 
there is a negative supply shock.  A negative supply shock will be accompanied by a 
combination of falling output and rising price levels.  A counter cyclical fiscal policy 
means that tax revenues decline and expenditures increase with GDP, and a debt structure 
characterized by nominal debt decreases the real debt service payout during the recession.  
Such a debt instrument supports the counter-cyclical fiscal policy over time in an 
economy faced with supply shocks.  The relationship between negative supply and 
demand shocks and the debt instruments that hedge government finances from these 
shocks are depicted in graph 3. 
                                                 
18  This depends on the structure of the economy. For example, an oil importing economy is likely to 
experience a supply shock.    16



















In practice, because the timing and the nature of the shock is uncertain, it is not possible 
to know ex-ante the ‘desired’ composition of debt that would hedge the fiscal position.  
In the real world, governments attempt to identify “combinations of conventional debt to 
make the real return on public debt conditional on future events” (Missale: 1997) in order 
to reduce the budgetary risk arising from volatile debt servicing.
19  For example, a debt 
composition with a mix of long-term price indexed and nominal debt may neutralize the 
impact of demand and supply shocks, minimizing the fluctuation in debt servicing costs.  
Further, diversification of debt instruments may help reduce cost and risk at the same 
time. The alternative for the debt manager is to ensure that debt service (including paying 
down the debt) is increased during good times so that they can afford to issue expensive 
debt and secure the necessary financing during bad times.  
 
Another financial characteristic that can create a mismatch between the government 
assets and liabilities is the cyclical characteristics of risk premium.  For emerging 
economies, recessions tend to be associated with higher risk premium, which means risk 
                                                 
19  With underdeveloped debt market, such combinations may not be feasible, or may only be implemented 
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premium is pro-cyclical (exacerbates recessions and booms).
20  The cyclical 
characteristic of the risk premium is closely tied to the cyclical properties of international 
capital flows.  For example, Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004) showed that capital 
inflows tend to be pro-cyclical for a large number of countries.  The cyclical 
characteristics of the capital flows are an important factor to consider when a large part of 
the public finance depends on external sources of funding.  
 
What is the implication for debt management when risk premium and capital flows are 
pro-cyclical?  When these are pro-cyclical, they suggest that increased refinancing needs 
during recession or a crisis when government revenues are low is not a good idea.  And 
since the timing of a recession or a crisis may be difficult to forecast, it suggests that it is 
more desirable to issue long-term debt, or to minimize the concentration of maturing debt 
in one period. 
  
The need to take into account risk premiums may be another reason why state contingent 
debt is not issued: issuance of state contingent debt may incur prohibitively high costs, 
particularly because of the counter-cyclicality of investor risk aversion and the pro-
cyclicality of the risk premium that this implies.  Paying fully for the risk premium may 
mean that the fiscal space for the current period is significantly reduced, and a zero risk 
policy may not be desirable.  Determining the trade-off between how much shock the 
fiscal and monetary authorities are willing to absorb when the risky event materializes, 
and how much cost the government is willing to pay to avoid such a shock, should 
therefore be the central subject of policy coordination. 
 
3.2. Consequences of Uncoordinated Policies with Debt Management 
 
In this section, the unpleasant monetarist arithmetic of Sargent and Wallace (1981) is 
extended with debt management by incorporating the ALM framework of analysis.  We 
begin by reviewing the original Sargent and Wallace (1981) setting. The starting point is 
                                                 
20 The pro-cyclicality of risk premium is more pronounced when crisis period is examined (see for example 
Broner, Lorenzoni and Schmukler: 2005).   18
the consolidated government budget constraint, where the budget deficit at time t is 
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where Dt is real debt at time t, PBt is the real primary balance, Mt – Mt-1 is the nominal 
value of seigniorage generated between time t-1 and t, pt is the price level, and r
f is the 
safe real interest on the debt.  The equation says that the change in debt is equal to 
interest payments, less the primary surplus and seigniorage. 
 
As Bohn (1991) notes, the budget constraint imposes no restrictions on government 
policy, and we need to introduce additional restrictions.  One basic restriction is to 
impose a feasibility constraint, whereby the debt level and the capacity to tax is limited 
by the level of income.  This is achieved by dividing both sides of equation (1) by GDP.  
To simplify, we let GDP grow by a constant rate n so that GDPt = (1+n) GDPt-1.  Letting 























=    (2) 
Fiscal policy is described by a sequence pb1, pb2, …, pbt, where pbt is the primary 
balance at time t.  Monetary policy is described by a time path M1, M2, …, Mt, where Mt 
is the stock of high powered money at time t.  Following Sargent and Wallace, we let M1 
as pre-determined and let alternative monetary policies be defined by alternative constant 
growth rate θ for Mt, t=2, 3, …, T.  For t > T, it is assumed that the path of Mt is 
determined by the condition that the debt to GDP ratio be held constant at the level at t = 
T.  The exercise is then to examine the consequences of the choice of θ and T. 
 
With M1 taken as given, we assume   
1 ) 1 ( − + = t t M M θ   (3)   19
A monetary policy is considered to be tighter for a smaller θ.  Suppose the price level is 
determined by the quantity theory of money with constant velocity vt = v, so that real 
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Equation (6) shows that when monetary policy is specified through θ and T, the inflation 
rate is determined for t = 2,3,…T.  Sargent and Wallace proceed to examine how the 
inflation rate for the period after T depends on the inflation rate chosen for the period 
before T.  They do this in two steps: first, determine how the inflation rate after time T 
depends on the stock of debt at t = T, dθT; and second, show how dθT depends on θ.   
 
To find the dependence of the inflation rate for t>T on dθT, we let Mt = pt* GDPt / v, and 
dt = dt-1 = dθT  for any date t > T.  Then (2) can be re-written as:  
t t
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re-arranging we have, 
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θ (8) 
If r
f - n > 0 as is assumed in Sargent and Wallace (1981), we have that the higher the debt 
level at time T, the higher the inflation rate, p t/pt-1 must be for t > T in order to keep debt 
constant at the level reached in time T. 
   20
We now introduce debt management in this model.  Three modifications to Sargent and 
Wallace are warranted. First, Sargent and Wallace model assumed that there is perfect 
foresight and no uncertainty, so the model has no randomness in it.  In our model, 
uncertainty is introduced, which makes the composition of debt relevant, because 
governments cannot foresee the state of nature when debt service must be made and may 
not be able to service their obligations if this coincides with the timing of falling 
revenues.
2122  “In a stochastic setting, spending and taxes do not provide a complete 
specification of government policy because the government still has to decide what kind 
of securities should be issued” (Bohn: 1995). 
 
Second, if insurance to reduce the degree of uncertainty is introduced, then the cost of 
insurance must be explicitly incorporated into the budget.  This will introduce a cost and 
risk trade-off for the choice of debt instrument that the government decides to issue. It 
also means that the rate of interest on the debt r is not a constant.
23  
 
Third, Sargent and Wallace (1981) defined debt management as the choice the central 
bank faces with respect to the amount of debt to be issued versus the amount of 
seigniorage to be recovered in order to fill the financing gap.  Debt management defined 
in this manner is conducted through open market operations, by exchanging debt with 
monetary base.  In our model (and this paper in general), debt management is defined as 
the management of the composition of debt of different maturities, currencies, and 
interest rates, as defined in the Guidelines for Public Debt Management.
24  The central 
bank, in turn, is assumed to confine its decisions to the determination of the amount of 
debt versus seigniorage to be recovered through monetization.  The initial level of debt, 
                                                 
21  In their model, the path of fiscal policy and monetary policy were announced at the beginning of the 
period (t = 1) and known by private agents.  They note that ‘once we assume that, it does not matter 
whether nominal or indexed debt is issued from t =1 onward’.  
22  If seigniorage is not a constant, then the timing of seigniorage, as well as the composition between debt 
and seigniorage becomes important.  
23  This brings in the need for assessing the impact on economic growth and tax revenues, etc, but this paper 
does not consider these effects.  
24 “Sovereign debt management is the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the 
government’s debt in order to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and 
to meet any other sovereign debt management goals the government may have set, such as developing and 
maintaining an efficient market for government securities”.   21
in turn, is determined by the fiscal authority, as is the subsequent stream of primary 
balances. 
 
Suppose now that instead of safe debt whose payout is fixed at 1+r
f, the government 
issues a debt whose payout, 1+r(st), is contingent on the state of nature at time t.  
Suppose also that the outcome of the primary balance is contingent on the state of nature 
at time t, pb(s t).  If the government can issue such a debt, then the co-movement between 
the debt payout and the primary balance will hedge the government finance and the result 
is equivalent to the certainty case, i.e., future inflation is determined by the behavior of 
the fiscal authorities before time T.  However, the cost of issuing a state contingent debt 
or any debt that reduces risk must also be taken into account.  Cost considerations may in 
turn require that the government assume some risk.  This implies that there is a need to 
consider the cost and risk trade-off of issuing debt, which in turn has some implications 
for current and future period inflation, as we show next.  
 
One consequence of issuing a state contingent debt is that the discount rate is unknown 
ex-ante and will differ from the risk free rate.  Indeed, it would be reasonable to assume 
that the expected value of such a discount rate would be greater than the risk free rate, i.e., 
that investors would demand a risk premium to purchase such a debt.  Risk premium 
should be determined by the creditor’s willingness to lend to the government, and this in 
turn depends on the assumption about the investor’s behavior.  The consumption based 
asset pricing (CAPM) model is useful in this regard. 
 
Drawing on CAPM, we can express the discount rate specific to state contingent debt as 
the marginal rate of substitution to consume by the asset holder (see for example, Bohn: 
1991, 1995): the welfare maximizing investor trades off his utility by foregoing a unit of 
known consumption at time t-1, and purchasing a unit of consumption at time t.  The 
consumption trade-off is achieved by storing wealth in the form of government debt 
which pays interest, 1+r(st), that is conditional on st.  The loss in utility at time t-1 is 
given by U’(Ct-1), and the expected gain in consumption utility at time t is Et-1{βU’(C(st))   22
*[1+r(st)]}.  The rational investor will continue to trade her consumption utility until she 
is indifferent between the two choices: 
)] ( 1 [ *
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Risk premium, expressed as the difference between the expected payout of the state 
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Since risk premium is positive, equation (10) suggests that the covariance between the 
marginal rate of substitution in consumption utility and the return on the state contingent 
debt must be negative.  From the investor’s perspective, “such an asset tends to have low 
returns when investors have high marginal utility.  It is risky in that it fails to deliver 
wealth precisely when wealth is most valuable to investors.  Investors therefore demand a 
large risk premium to hold it” (Campbell 1999).  From the issuer’s perspective, the risk 
premium is the insurance premium that the government pays in order to ensure that debt 
service is made when the funds are available, i.e., when the economy is strong and the 
primary surpluses are high.  In other words, the risk premium buys the government a 
hedge which generates a positive covariance between debt service and the primary 
surplus.  For example, if the primary surplus has long duration, then a government debt 
with a long duration will have a positive covariance with the primary surplus and reduces 
the risk for the government.  But in order to issue longer dated debt, the government must 
pay a premium over its shorter dated debt, because the risk averse investor prefers a 
shorter dated debt over longer dated debt as the former tends to deliver utility (e.g., in the 
form of liquidity) when this is most valuable to the investor (e.g., when there is a 
recession, when the government generates a primary deficit).
25  
 
Adding the risk premium (10), normalized by the growth rate of the economy 1+n, to the 
risk free interest rate in equation (8), we have: 
                                                 
25  The link between the covariance between the marginal rate of consumption substitution and the return 
on the risky asset, and the covariance between the primary surplus and debt service can be established 
through the relationship Tt - Gt ≤ Yt - Gt = Ct.    23
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  (11) 
Since the risk premium is always positive, the covariance between the marginal rates of 
substitution to consume and the gross return on the risky asset must be negative.  
Equation (11) says that the higher the risk premium that the government must pay, the 
greater the inflation rate between time t-1 and t, unless the cost of risk premium is paid by 
primary surplus at time t.   
 
Conversely, suppose a low cost/low risk premium debt whose covariance between the 
marginal rates of consumption substitution and the return on asset is close to zero.  This 
reduces the need for inflation financing or for additional primary surplus compared to a 
high cost/high risk premium debt.  However, the ramification of the low cost debt 
strategy is that because the payout of the debt tends to increase when the investor’s utility 
of the payout is high, this increase the risk that debt servicing increases precisely at the 
moment when the government has the least capacity to pay (i.e., during a recession or 
economic crisis). This will in turn, necessitate future inflation rates to increase.  Hence, 
not only the level of debt at time T, but the decision on the timing of the primary deficits 
and debt servicing payout and the cost-risk trade-off that the timing decision implies, can 
cause inflation to increase in future periods. 
 
The discussion above illustrates that because it is possible to find a low financing 
alternative today at the expense of increasing risk in the future, the flow equation in (11) 
is incomplete without examining the long-term consequences of the cost-risk trade off 
and the particular policy mix implemented over time.  
 
Returning to the original Sargent and Wallace (1981) model, in the second stage, it is 
shown that a tighter monetary policy now implies higher inflation rate later.  This is done 
by demonstrating that the smaller the θ, the higher the dθT.  Re-arranging (2) and 
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θ    (12) 
Through this equation, it can be seen that the smaller the chosen rate of growth of 
inflation θ  today, the higher the debt level at time T. 
 
We now examine the implication of incorporating debt management in (12).  This is 
achieved by drawing on Bohn (1995).  Substituting the safe interest rate with the 
marginal rates of consumption substitution (9) and a primary balance that depends on the 
state of nature at time t, we obtain the inter-temporal government budget constraint for t 
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where 






















 denotes equilibrium value of the marginal rate of 
substitution between time t+k-1 and t+k consumption, or the time varying interest rate on 
the risky debt. Equation (12) states that the future stock of debt at time T given θ is equal 
to the initial debt less the future value of the expected future primary surpluses and the 
future seigniorage, compounded by a factor that varies over time and states of nature.   
 
Using the fact that the expectation of a product is the product of the expectations plus the 
covariance, and using 
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How does debt management affect the sustainability of fiscal policies?  Equation (14) 
states that even if the sum of the expected value of the primary balance and seigniorage is 
on average negative, fiscal policy can still be sustainable, if the sum of the covariance 
between the interest payout of the debt and the primary surplus and the covariance 
between the interest payout and seigniorage are sufficiently positive.
26   
 
The “if” is an important qualifier, and depends on whether fiscal policy and monetary 
policy is conducted pro- or counter-cyclically, and on the insurance that the government 
purchased in prior periods.  To simplify, we let seigniorage be a constant as defined in (6), 
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If fiscal policy is counter-cyclical, i.e., the primary surplus declines during recession, a 
debt whose payout is low during recession will be desirable.  This will produce a positive 
covariance.  The extent to which such a hedge is in place depends on how much hedge is 
purchased as a result of paying the risk premium in prior periods.  Equation (15) says that 
if the timing of primary balance and debt service payout co-varies and is sufficiently 
positive, then given dθT, it can soften the effect that low inflation today will lead to high 
inflation in the future.  Conversely, if the debt manager takes a low cost high risk strategy, 
the covariance will be low or negative, and this can lead to higher inflation in the future 
(relative to the certainty case). 
 
Another implication is derived from the likely behavior of (9).  When the economy is 
strong and consumption is growing rapidly, investors’ appetite for risk tends to increase, 
and when the economy is in recession and consumption growth is declining, investors 
                                                 
26 With risk aversion, the covariances will disappear only if the primary surpluses are uncorrelated with 
future marginal utility.  “In practice, such uncorrelatedness will probably be rare, since it is difficult to 
imagine a tax and spending policy that is uncorrelated with government spending and with aggregate 
income, which are the variables determining the marginal utility of consumption” (Bohn: 1995).   26
become more risk averse.  Such investor behavior is reflected in the risk premium which 
moves in opposite direction with consumption growth.
27   
 
The fact that the investor’s risk aversion is counter-cyclical poses a dilemma for the 
government that wants to hold dθT 
 constant after time T.  The problem for the 
government in a world with time varying risk averse investor with counter-cyclical 
properties is that the cost of issuing debt will be high in bad times, precisely when the 
government does not want to raise taxes and would rather run a primary deficit and 
finance the deficit through debt issuance.  On the other hand, if the hedge is purchased 
during good times when investor’s risk appetite is great and the risk premium is low, the 
timing of the purchase coincides with the timing when the government can most afford it.  
This implies that the hedge must be purchased in good times financed by the primary 
surplus or seigniorage.  If this is deferred to later periods when the situation deteriorates, 
the debt manager is compelled to purchase future hedges at a high cost, precisely at the 
moment when it can least afford it. 
 
4. Applications: Games Policy Makers Play 
 
Having set out the analytical framework, we now examine the consequences of 
uncoordinated mix of fiscal, monetary, and debt management policies.  The objective is 
to illustrate the types of policy switching necessary if sustainability conditions do not 
hold.
 28 We do so by building on Sargent and Wallace (1993) who examined the 
consequences of uncoordinated fiscal and monetary policies, whereby the fiscal authority 
chose a course of policy without regard to any coordinated policy goals.  The central 
bank, on the other hand, pursued a responsible monetary policy fighting inflation.  Under 
this uncoordinated policy scheme, they showed how policies became unsustainable 
unless either of the authorities adjusted its original course of policy.  We extend this 
game by overlaying debt management to the original games under fiscal and monetary 
                                                 
27  The time variance of the risk premium reflects the risk aversion of the investor whose marginal rate of 
substitution of consumption utility falls during good times and rises during bad times.   
28  Bohn (1991) suggested that if there remained any positive probability that sustainability might not hold, 
then there should be a complete description of the policy rule that would be followed in the event that 
sustainability condition were to be violated.     27
dominance regimes.  We present the debt manager as the weak policy player dominated 
by the other policy authorities.   
 
(a) Fiscal dominance with debt management 
Suppose a fiscal dominant regime similar to Sargent and Wallace (1993), where the fiscal 
authority pursues an irresponsible policy and does not change the policy course.  Assume 
that the monetary authority implements a constant inflation policy, such as (5).
29  In 
addition, assume a weak debt manager subordinate to the fiscal authority.  Given this 
institutional setting, the fiscal authority pressures the debt manager to reduce current 
period debt servicing costs to contain the overall budget deficit.  As a result, the debt 
manager issues low cost but high risk debt.  This is achieved by issuing debt with low 
risk premium in equation (10).  As equation (11) suggests, low risk premium requires less 
seniorage that the monetary authority has to generate to finance the deficit. 
 
As a consequence, in the short run, the fiscal authority is able to continue with 
irresponsible policies without forcing the monetary authority to adjust.  But the medium-
term outlook presents a different picture: sustainability of the debt becomes suspect, not 
only because of the accumulation of primary deficits generated by the fiscal authorities, 
but also because of the increase in the riskiness of the debt portfolio.
30  In the end, as 
fiscal adjustment will not take place under this regime, the monetary authority will have 
to give in and deficit must be financed through increases in seigniorage.  But by this time, 
the accumulated debt is greater than in the original fiscal dominance case in Sargent and 
Wallace, and the inflation adjustment required by the monetary authority will 
correspondingly be greater.
31  An alternative outcome may be that the monetary authority 
                                                 
29  The impact of a tight monetary policy on fiscal policy and debt management policy is likely to be high, 
through its impact on slower economic growth, lower tax revenues, and higher interest costs, but we are not 
considering these effects here. 
30 In addition to increased interest cost due to the increase in interest rate relative to the growth rate of the 
economy, foreign currency debt to GDP ratio measured in domestic currency unit may suffer large capital 
losses if there is a devaluation. Debt whose principal is indexed may also suffer capital losses in the event 
of a sudden increase in the index value. This is captured in the negative covariance between debt service 
and the primary surplus in equation (14). 
31 This is due to the increased debt servicing cost arising from the accumulation of the negative covariance 
between debt servicing and the primary surplus, in addition to the continuation of the policy of 
accumulating primary deficit made possible by the low cost, high risk debt management strategy.   28
is forced to conduct a policy in which there is co-movement between debt service payout 
and money supply to finance the debt service in equation (14). 
 
Another policy implication refers to the timing of policy adjustments.  In Sargent and 
Wallace, it was shown that if the demand for government bonds implied an interest rate 
on bonds greater than the rate of growth of the economy, then the monetary authority 
trying to fight current inflation would eventually have to let inflation loose as debt 
approached unsustainable levels.  Incorporating debt management compounds to this 
effect through the higher than expected realized payout as a result of issuing low cost 
high risk debt. 
 
(b) Monetary dominance with debt management 
Where there is monetary dominance, the monetary authority determines the quantity of 
money base and therefore the price level through a set formula, for example, (4).
32  
Suppose the monetary authority sets money supply to a constant, Mt = Mt-1, so that 
seigniorage σ = 0.  Under this regime, government deficits have no bearing on the rate of 
inflation because they have no effect on the path of base money.  With the possibility of 
monetization ruled out, the policy adjustments must come from the fiscal authority or the 
debt manager.  But with a fiscal authority unwilling to adjust its policy path, it again 
pressures the debt manager to lower the cost of financing to reduce current period debt 
servicing cost.  This will create fiscal space and buys some time for the fiscal authority, 
but at the expense of increased future risk in the debt portfolio.  However, with the actual 
or prospective realization of a risky event, debt becomes unsustainable.  Because the 
possibility of seigniorage is ruled out, it is eventually the fiscal authority that has to adjust.  
However, as in the case of fiscal dominance regime, by this time, the debt level is likely 
to be greater than in the original Sargent and Wallace case, as it is compounded by 
increases in interest costs and capital losses arising from poor debt structures; therefore 
the fiscal adjustment required will correspondingly greater.
33 
                                                 
32  We are ignoring the impact that such a monetary rule might have on real interest rates. 
33 Again, this is due to the increased debt servicing cost arising from the accumulation of the negative 
covariance between debt servicing and the primary surplus, in addition to the continuation of the policy of 
accumulating primary deficit.   29
 
The analysis may be extended to a world where weak debt management is combined with 
the accumulation of implicit or explicit contingent liabilities. The threat of realization of 
the contingent liabilities, such as calls on guarantees, bail out of the banking sector, 
recapitalization of the central bank or other public sector institutions, or the collapse of 
the fixed exchange rate regime, can lead to pressures to lower current period financing 
cost.  Such pressures can buy little time, but not much.  Indeed, it is likely to lead to 
greater pressures leading governments into solvency crisis, even under prudent fiscal 
policy (for example during the Asian financial crisis of 1997).  Because monetary policy 
is not accommodative, ultimately the burden of policy adjustment falls on the fiscal 
authority.   
 
Consider now a variation in the monetary dominant regime.  Imagine the case where 
monetary policy lacks credibility.  The monetary authority therefore pressures the debt 
manager to issue risky debt (such as short-term debt) to ensure the time consistency of 
monetary policy (see for example Calvo and Guidotti: 1990).  To distinguish from the 
previous example, suppose that instead of an irresponsible policy, the fiscal authority 
initially runs a responsible policy so that there is primary surplus, on average.  However, 
as Bohn (1991) showed, sound fiscal policy unsupported by sound debt management 
raises the possibility that debt will become unsustainable.  In practice, the possibility or 
severity of a sustainability crisis will be much lower than the example where poor debt 
management is combined with poor fiscal policy.
34  However, the consequence of such a 
policy mix might be a liquidity crisis which could force the fiscal authority to adjust, i.e., 
they may have to cut expenditures and/or raise tax revenues during a recession or a crisis, 
forcing the fiscal authorities to conduct a pro-cyclical fiscal policy, accentuating 
recessions and booms.  Paradoxically, the attempt by the monetary authority to ensure 
time consistency results to be an inconsistent policy mix after all.   
 
Several financial crises in the late 1990s have demonstrated evidence that fiscal 
dominance and (excessive) monetary dominance have forced debt managers into low 
                                                 
34 Risky debt structures by itself is unlikely to generate a sustainability crisis if debt levels are low.    30
cost/high risk strategy. For example, in Brazil, until about May of 1998, debt 
management had been in the process of extending the maturity of the domestic bonds.  As 
a result, it was able to weather the first financial shock arising from the Asian crisis, 
despite rising debt levels arising from lax fiscal policy and the realization of large 
contingent liabilities in 1997.  However, with the onset of the Russian crisis, the central 
bank once again raised domestic interest rates in order to defend the local currency, the 
Reais, which was fixed against the US$.  By May 1998, the government decided that it 
was too expensive to lengthen the maturity of the domestic debt and decided to reverse its 
course and began issuing short term debt, thinking that the hike in interest rate was 
temporary.  They also increased the issuance of foreign exchange linked debt.  However, 
interest rates did not come down as the authorities had hoped. As speculative attack on 
the Reais mounted, investors became less willing to purchase long term domestic paper 
even at high interest rates.  As short term debt accumulated, and the central bank’s 
intervention in the foreign exchange market led to rapidly declining reserves, the 
government’s ability to roll over debt became questionable. Speculative attacks on the 
currency finally lead the central bank to change is policy course, allowing the Reais to 





This paper discussed the desirability of policy separation between fiscal policy, monetary 
policy and debt management.  The asset and liability management framework assist in 
identifying and managing the macroeconomic risks of uncoordinated policies.  The 
consequences of uncoordinated policy mix was illustrated extending the Sargent and 
Wallace (1981 and 1993) analysis with debt management.  Examples of policy games 
between fiscal policy, monetary policy, and debt management illustrated how a weak 
debt manager without a separate policy goal could lead to inconsistent policy mix.  
 
In particular, the paper illustrated how decision by the debt manager can have important 
trade-off implications for the fiscal and monetary authorities in determining their policies   31
over time.  If the debt manager chooses to lower cost (this period) by increasing risk (in 
the next period) there will be greater (short run) fiscal space for the fiscal authorities, and 
there will be greater scope for the central bank to conduct a tight monetary policy today.  
However, if in the next period, the bad state of nature materializes and the debt servicing 
cost suddenly increases, the fiscal authority loses its fiscal space gained in the previous 
period, and may even have to contract its policy to pay for the increased debt servicing.  
If the fiscal authority cannot generate primary surplus in the next period (say because the 
timing coincides with a recession), then the central bank may have to loosen up its 
monetary policy to increase seigniorage.
35  If the fiscal authority has to adjust, it will 
effectively be forced to conduct a pro-cyclical fiscal policy.  The lessons in these cases 
suggest that debt management should not be used to support monetary policy or poor 
fiscal policy.  It points to the importance of policy coordination to ensure that the policy 
mix is consistent and sustainable. 
 
It was also shown that debt management can buy time, but procrastination of policy 
adjustment can be much more costly over the longer term than the case where short-term 
fiscal expediency is not allowed to dominate debt management.  Thus, 
 “crises are more frequent and more severe when short-term borrowing and dollar 
denominated external debt are high, and foreign direct investment and reserves are low, 
in large part because balance sheets are then very sensitive to increases in exchange rates 
and short-term interest rates…If countries that are faced with a fall in capital inflows 
adjusted more promptly, rather than stalling for time by running down reserves or shifting 
to loans that are shorter-termed and dollar-denominated, they might be able to adjust on 
more attractive terms…It is precisely the decision to delay adjustment that leaves crisis 
victims with few good options, because balance sheets have deteriorated in the mean 
time” (Frankel and Wei: 2005). 
 
Another policy implication is that the initial debt to GDP ratio should be lower, or the 
desired primary surplus should be higher, the higher the risk premium charged and/or the 
                                                 
35 If the recession is caused by a supply shock accompanied by high inflation, the timing of monetary 
loosening to ensure fiscal sustainability could aggravate inflation.   32
higher the vulnerability arising from poor debt structures.  The IMF has calculated that 
given greater vulnerability of emerging market economies, the maximum sustainable debt 
level in these countries was much lower than the equivalent for OECD countries.
36   
 
Future work can usefully extend the analysis to test its empirical relevance.  For example, 
Herrera (2004) describes the sequence of policy actions and evolution of the 
macroeconomic policy mix including debt management in Brazil, and Pinto, Gurvich, 
and Ulatov (2004) describe this for Russia, which can be useful in identifying the timing 
of policy shifts and changes in the composition of debt and their relationship with fiscal 
and monetary policies.  Another area of research is a closer examination of the cyclical 
characteristics of monetary policy and its impact on debt management.  For example, 
Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004) showed that monetary policy tends to be conducted 
pro-cyclically in developing countries.  Coupled with the pro-cyclical tendency of fiscal 
policy (see for example, Gavin and Perotti: 1997, and Talvi and Vegh: 2000 in Latin 
America), it would be useful to examine the implications of debt management on pro-
cyclical monetary policy.  
 
                                                 
36  See for example, IMF (2003) World Economic Outlook, ‘Public Debt in Emerging Markets’, September.     33
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